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Abstract
Japan has implemented a number of anti-smoking policies; these in-
clude information disclosures, taxation, and smoking bans. These mea-
sures have increased the information available to consumers, as well as
tax rates on tobacco products. First, this paper shows, theoretically,
the association between a lack of information and over-consumption
of cigarettes, and then examines the effects of smoking policies using
monthly data from 1951 to 1999. Long-term policies have had greater
effects than short-term policies. Taxation has reduced consumption,
but income differences have had no significant effect. Following health
disclosures in 1964 and 1967, many consumers switched to filtered
cigarettes and low-nicotine and low-tar products, respectively. The
move to lower tar and nicotine products was further accelerated by the
?harmful to health?label applied to cigarettes in 1972, although many
smokers then raised the number of cigarettes they smoked to keep up
their intake of nicotine. Other policies have decreased cigarette, nico-
tine, and tar consumption since 1972.
JEL classification: I18; D11; D12
Keywords: anti-smoking, health information, nicotine-tar, compensative
behavior, rational addiction
1 Introduction
1.1 Purpose and findings
Smoking is a complicated behavior. Price, income, and past and future
cigarette consumption influence smoking behaviors, as do factors such as
health information and regulations related to this unhealthy and addictive
behavior. It is thus important to understand how cigarette consumers re-
spond to health information and regulations. Here, I incorporate health
information into a rational addiction (RA) model. The model indicates that
consumers over-consume cigarettes due to a lack of information on related
health hazards, and that more and new information reduces consumption.
Because smoking is addictive and detrimental to health, to protect human
health and reduce the social costs of smoking, the Japanese government
has implemented anti-smoking policies that include health information dis-
closures, taxation, and smoking bans. This paper examines the effects of
these policies on cigarette consumption, and on nicotine and tar intake,
within a framework of rational addiction and non-addiction using general-
ized methods of moments (GMM), ordinary least-squares (OLS) techniques,
and monthly data from Japan from 1951 to 1999.
The analyses showed that anti-smoking policies have had a significant
impact on consumer behavior. Long-term policies have had as much as twice
the impact of short-term policies, and long-term policies, such as health haz-
ard information campaigns and tax increases, have become more developed
over time. Consumers have responded by changing their cigarette type or by
reducing or quitting smoking. The share of filtered cigarette sales has been
increasing since the 1960s, following the first official information disclosure
on cigarette risks in Japan. Consumers have also switched to low-nicotine
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and low-tar cigarettes, following the release of data on nicotine and tar con-
sumption in 1967. The printing of? smoking is harmful to health?on every
cigarette package since 1972 has further increased the move to lower tar and
nicotine products, although consumers have compensatively raised their to-
tal consumption of low-nicotine/tar brands to maintain a consistent intake
of nicotine, owing to the addictiveness of cigarettes. However, other control
policies implemented since 1972, such as workplace smoking bans, smoking
science research, health warnings, nicotine labeling, and official reports on
smoking, have helped reduce the consumption of cigarettes, nicotine, and
tar overall.
1.2 Japanese smoking issues and international regulations
Smoking is a serious social and economic problem in Japan, with lung cancer
ranking as the most dangerous cancer in the country since 1996. In 2000, the
adjusted mortality rate in Japan from lung cancer was as much as 2.5 times
greater than the average rates in the U.S., Germany, Italy, France, Sweden,
and the Netherlands.1 The smoking rate in Japan is very high compared
to rates in other developed countries.2 Scientific research has shown that
smoking causes many kinds of cancer, especially lung cancer. Even without
accounting for the loss of human life caused by smoking, the social costs of
smoking are immense.3
To reduce and prevent smoking worldwide, the World Health Organiza-
tion (WHO) Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) was unan-
1The number of deaths caused by lung cancer was reported as 39,053 males and 14,671
females in 2000. See Ikeda and Kamimura (1998) and Ikeda et al. (2004) for details.
2According to a survey by Japan Tobacco Inc., 45.8% of adult males and 13.8% adult
females smoked in 2005.
3Social cost = medical costs, etc. - (tax revenue + benefit of tobacco industry, etc.).
Japan?s national health insurance system may actually be one cause of the high smoking
rate because smokers do not have to pay additional insurance premiums under the system.
See Wan (forthcoming) for details.
2
imously approved by all WHO members (192 countries) on 27 May 2003.
Japan also ratified this treaty and instituted its principles on 27 Febru-
ary 2005. The treaty focuses on information dissemination concerning the
health effects of smoking, taxation on tobacco products, and smoking bans.
Japan has instituted numerous policies similar to those recommended by
the FCTC. Japan ?s anti-smoking policies will be detailed in Section 2.2.
1.3 Related literature and departure from previous studies
Many previous papers have analyzed the consumption of hazardous goods
such as cigarettes. Ippolito (1981) developed a theoretical model to analyze
consumer reactions to new health information. Ippolito and Ippolito (1984)
provided empirical evidence to show that new health information reduces
cigarette consumption. Goldbaum (2000) showed that an endogenous desire
to quit smoking can result from a rational consumption path chosen as the
consumer begins smoking. Viscusi (1992) and Hu et al. (1995) also reported
that health hazard information has a strong effect on consumer behavior.
Clark and Etile (2002), based on British data, found that smokers who
develop health problems from smoking are likely to smoke less or quit in the
future. The effects of anti-smoking policies such as workplace smoking bans
were analyzed by Evans et al. (1999) and Bardsley and Olekalns (1999),
whose results indicate that such bans reduce smoking. Here, a testable RA
model incorporating health information and regulations was constructed and
tested using Japanese policy events and monthly data on cigarette, nicotine,
and tar consumption.
Although several studies have examined Japanese cigarette consumption,
their focus and methods differed from those of this paper. For example,
Haden (1990) was not concerned with addiction and health hazard infor-
3
mation. Without considering the addictive aspect, Yorozu and Zhou (2002)
found that?information?reduces smoking, using cross-sectional, prefecture-
level data; however, the information measure in this instance was prefectural
anti-smoking budget dummy data collected by telephone conversations with
prefectural officials.4 Using panel data on inter-brand cigarettes, Wan (June
2004) found that the mandatory information disclosure of nicotine and tar
content has decreased the demand for high-tar (nicotine) brands, but that
consumers have compensatively increased total consumption to keep their
nicotine intake steady.
1.4 Structure of the paper
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 examines
knowledge and beliefs in relation to smoking and the main anti-smoking
policies in Japan. Section 3 describes the conceptual and empirical specifi-
cations, while section 4 presents the data and empirical strategy, and section
5 reports the estimation results. The conclusion and policy implications are
discussed in section 6.
4Two other issues must also be addressed. First, Yorozu and Zhou (2002, p. 79) listed
per capita consumption as 414.32 packs (20 cigarettes per pack) per year, but the?Public
Finance Statistics? publication edited by the Ministry of Finance of Japan, and Wan
(forthcoming), show per capita consumption in 1990 and 1995 as 130.03 (20 cigarettes
per pack) and 133.25 packs, respectively; therefore, the consumption data may have been
overestimated by as much as three times by the former study. Second, the effect of the
anti-smoking budget may have arisen from the discretionary estimation method (pooled
OLS of a 2-year panel) and prefectural fixed effects. Additionally, an anti-smoking budget
may be used not only for information dissemination but also for other purposes, such as
the construction of smoking areas (because of smoking bans in other areas).
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2 Knowledge, Beliefs, and Anti-smoking Policies
2.1 Knowledge and beliefs in relation to smoking in Japan
A number of surveys have examined smoking and health in Japan.5 Two
surveys have collected information on the harmful effects of smoking.6 Table
1a lists the percentages of respondents who knew about the negative health
impacts of smoking. In this table, the values in the? difference? column
indicate the increase in the proportion reporting to know about the damage
from smoking.7 All the values were positive and significant, indicating that
information on smoking damage has increased over time.
Smokers ?reasons for reducing or quitting smoking are shown in Table
1b.8 The most important reason given for every year is that smoking is
? harmful to health.?The change in the importance of health reasons from
1981 to 1988 was larger than that from 1988 to 1999. This implies that there
was a sharp increase in the amount of information regarding smoking hazards
from 1981 to 1988. The second most important reason changed over time.
Cost was relatively unimportant and increased little in importance from
1981 to 1988 due to the relatively low real price of cigarettes and the bubble
economy. In contrast, the effect of cost increased sharply in importance from
1988 to 1999 due to the relatively high real price of cigarettes that resulted
from a tax increase and Japan ?s depressed economy.
5See Appendix for details.
6The questions used almost the same wording to describe the health damage from
smoking, even though these two surveys were conducted by two different institutions, and
at different times.
7The samples of the surveys were assumed to have binomial distributions. Difference
tests were used to test whether there were differences in information between earlier and
later surveys, and among smokers, former smokers, and non-smokers.
8Former smokers ?reasons for quitting or reducing smoking are not shown here. The
reasons are very similar to those of smokers who want to quit.
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2.2 Anti-smoking policies in Japan
Governmental policies are considered a main contributor to the changes in
consumer attitudes described in section 2.1. Following the? Report on
Smoking and Health? by the Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare of
Japan (MHLWJ), the government has implemented a number of tobacco-
control policies. There were ten main tobacco-control policies instituted
between 1951 and 1999, as well as six rises in cigarette tax hikes. These
policies can be roughly divided into three parts: information disclosure,
cigarette taxes, and smoking bans.
The MHLWJ first issued information on the detrimental health effects
of smoking on 6 February 1964 in a report entitled?A Notice about Health
Damage from Smoking.?The report was given to prefectural governors and
to the mayors of several designated cities, and followed the release of the U.S.
?Smoking and Health Report,?published in 1964. In April 1967, information
on nicotine and tar content was released in newspapers, as mandated by
the Ministry of Finance. Beginning August 1972, cigarette manufacturers
were required to include the following warning on all cigarette packages,
?Let?s be careful about smoking too much for health reasons.?In October
1987, the first edition of the? Report on Smoking and Health,?edited by
the MHLWJ, was released. In January 1990, cigarette manufactures were
required to include the following warning on cigarette packages,?Let?s be
careful about smoking too much because there is a possibility that it will
ruin your health,?and to print the nicotine and tar contents on the package.
The MHLWJ released the second edition of the? Report on Smoking and
Health? in May 1993. In the analysis, dummies were used to examine the
effects of information dissemination.
Taxes on tobacco products increased six times from 1951 to 1999, as
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summarized by Wan (2001). The first proposed cigarette tax increase was
passed in the House of Representatives on 12 April 1968 and enforced on 1
May 1968. The second, and additional increases up to the sixth, were passed
on 25 October 1975, 7 February 1980, 1 February 1983, 8 May 1986, and
6 October 1998, respectively, and enforced on 18 December 1975, 22 April
1980, 1 May 1983, 1 May 1986, and 1 December 1998, respectively. Thus,
consumers can expect future tax and price variations.9
Other policies also aimed to control tobacco use. In April 1978, the
MHLWJ issued an edict requiring national hospitals and sanitariums under
its jurisdiction to restrict smoking to certain areas. In June 1978, domestic
airlines instituted non-smoking areas, while in July 1978, ferries connected
with Japan Railway instituted non-smoking sections. The Japanese govern-
ment also established the Smoking Research Foundation in April 1986 to
scientifically examine the health effects of smoking.
3 Conceptual and Empirical Specifications
A model was required to identify the effects of the anti-smoking policies
described in Section 2.2. The anti-smoking policies have mainly focused on
health information, taxation, and workplace smoking bans. The workplace
smoking ban, to some extent, constitutes an extension of the information
dissemination policies because smoking bans aim to protect human health
and to reduce consumption, both directly and indirectly, by serving as re-
minders of the danger of smoking. Thus, in this study, health information
was incorporated into the framework adopted from Becker et al. (1994).
As Stigler and Becker (1977) have noted,? A consumer may indirectly
receive utility from a market good, yet the utility depends not only the
9Source: the Asahi Shimbun, a main newspaper in Japan, 1951-1999.
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quantity of the good, but also the consumer ?s knowledge of its true or
alleged properties. If he does not know whether the berries are poisonous,
they are not food, if he does not know that they contain vitamin C, they
are not consumed to prevent scurvy.?The consumer derives utility from
a good based on his or her limited knowledge about it. This knowledge
is produced by scientific research and is thus exogenous to the consumer.
Cigarette demand as a function of health hazard information was therefore
derived, as follows.
Consumers were assumed to have infinite lives and to maximize lifetime
utility discounted at the rate r. Utility was composed of two parts: euphoria
from smoking and disutility from knowing the health hazards of smoking.
Consumption euphoria and the disutility of the health hazard were assumed
to be separable.10 The consumer?s utility is bounded by his or her limited
information.
V (Ct, Ct−1, Yt, et; It) = U(Ct, Ct−1, Yt, et)− α(It)Ct. (1)
10For simplicity, I assumed that the disutility of the health hazard is separable
from the consumption utility. I examined the case for which the disutility from the
health hazard was non-separable from the consumption utility as V (Ct, Ct−1, Yt, et; It) =
[γ(It)Ct]U(Ct, Ct−1, Yt, et). The calculation was complicated, but in the simplest case,
V (Ct, Ct−1, Yt, et; It) = γ(It)U(Ct, Ct−1, Yt, et); the demand equation was almost the
same as equation (3), where η(It) = 0 and the coefficient of Ct+1 was not βθ but
[γ(It+1)/γ(It)]βθ. If negative information shock (or bad news) means that γ(It+1)/γ(It)
becomes smaller, this (negative) information shock may increase consumption because the
consumer becomes less forward looking, and increases current consumption, increasing the
absolute values of short- and long-run price elasticities. The amount of information on
the health hazards of smoking has increased with time; thus, γ(It+1)/γ(It) may have de-
creased with time. This decreasing γ(It+1)/γ(It) may explain why estimates of β have
been too small in the literature, e.g., in Becker et al. (1994), and in this paper. The
detailed proof is available upon request.
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The consumer ?s problem is
max
∞∑
t=1
βt−1
[
U(Ct, Ct−1, Yt, et)− α(It)Ct
]
. (2)
s.t.
∞∑
t=1
βt−1(Yt + PtCt) = A0
β = 1/(1 + r)
Here Ct, Ct−1 are the quantities of cigarettes consumed in periods t and t-1,
respectively. Yt is the consumption of the composite commodity in period t,
and et reflects the impact of unmeasured life-cycle variables on utility. The
composite commodity, Y , is the numeraire, and thus the price of cigarettes
in period t is denoted by Pt. The rate of interest was assumed to equal
the rate of time preference. β is the time discount factor. Any effect of
C on earnings and on the present value of wealth (A0) were ignored. The
same applies to the effect of C on other types of uncertainty. The initial
condition for the consumer in period 1, C0, measures the level of cigarette
consumption in the period prior to the one under consideration.
α(It) is the consumer?s disutility factor, which is the consumer?s subjec-
tive belief that smoking is truly harmful to his or her health. This subjective
belief was assumed to increase with? information It?by a Bayesian learning
framework; thus, dα(It)dIt > 0. New beliefs will be formed when new health
hazard information is announced.
The associated first-order conditions are
Uy(Ct, Ct−1, Yt, et) = λ,
U1(Ct, Ct−1, Yt, et) + βU2(Ct+1, Ct, Yt+1, et+1)− α(It) = λPt.
A consumption euphoria function that is quadratic in Yt, Ct, and et was
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considered. By solving the first-order condition for Yt and substituting it into
the first-order condition for Ct, a linear difference equation can be derived:
Ct = θ0 + θCt−1 + βθCt+1 + θ1Pt + η(It) + θ2et + θ3et+1 (3)
where,11
η(It) =
uyyα(It)
(u11uyy − u21y) + β(u22uyy − u22y)
. (4)
Health hazard information cannot be anticipated by the consumer. If the
consumer obtains new health hazard information at time t, the short-run
effect of health hazard information is
dCt
dI∗
=
1
θ(1− φ1)φ2
dη(It)
dIt
< 0, (5)
which is defined as the impact of an increase in current and all future infor-
mation on current consumption, with past consumption being held constant.
If there is no information depreciation, the long-run effect of health hazard
information is
dC∞
dI
=
1
θ(1− φ1)(φ2 − 1)
dη(It)
dIt
< 0, (6)
which is defined as the effect of a permanent increase in information, in all
11This model setting and equation (3) have also been presented by Wan (2001, Dec.
2004). There appears to be a misprint in the publication by Becker et al. (1994). Accord-
ing to my calculations, the last multiplicative term in the numerator of the formula for θ3
should be u2yuey instead of u2yu2e.
θ0 = −λ(uy1 + βuy2), θ = −(u12uyy−u1yu2y)(u11uyy−u21y)+β(u22uyy−u22y) , θ1=
uyyλ
(u11uyy−u21y)+β(u22uyy−u22y)
,
θ2=
−(uyyu1e−u1yuey)
(u11uyy−u21y)+β(u22uyy−u22y)
, θ3=
−β(uyyu2e−u2yuey)
(u11uyy−u21y)+β(u22uyy−u22y)
. A good is considered ad-
dictive if θ > 0; the degree of addiction increases with θ. The roots of the differ-
ence equation are φ1 =
1−(1−4θ2β)1/2
2θ
, φ2 =
1+(1−4θ2β)1/2
2θ
, and the stability condi-
tions are 4θ2β < 1, φ1 < 1, φ2 > 1. The short- and long-run price effects are
dCt
dP∗ =
θ1
θ(1−φ1)φ2 ,
dC∞
dP
= θ1
θ(1−φ1)(φ2−1) . See Becker et al. (1994) for details.
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periods. |dC∞dI | > |dCtdI∗ |, meaning that the absolute value of the long-run
effect is larger than that of the short-run effect.
4 Dataset and Estimation Strategy
4.1 Dataset and variable creation
The data were comprised of monthly time series data from Jan. 1951 to
Oct. 1999. Table 2a presents the means, standard deviations, and other
descriptive statistics for the variables, following seasonal adjustments.
Cigarette purchases by Japanese worker households (Ct) refers
to cigarette purchases in packs (20 cigarettes per pack) per capita, per
month, per family, divided by the number of family members.12 Purchase
data were obtained from the? Annual Report of Family Income and Ex-
penditure Survey (FIES).?13 Hoarding and stock dummies were taken into
account. The data were seasonally adjusted using X-12 ARIMA, a seasonal
adjustment program.
Nicotine intaket is the monthly intake of nicotine in minigrams per
capita. The data were created by multiplying cigarette purchases by nicotine
content per cigarette. The data were then seasonally adjusted using X-12
ARIMA.
Tar intaket is the monthly intake of tar in minigrams per capita. The
data were made by multiplying cigarette purchases by the tar content per
cigarette and seasonally adjusted using X-12 ARIMA.
Price (Pt) is the real average retail cigarette price per pack for each
12In the FIES, the respondents were divided into two groups: worker and non-worker
households. A non-worker household has no labor income. In this study, only information
on worker households was used because a labor income variable was available for this
group.
13The trend of per capita cigarette purchase is similar to the statistical data shown in
Wan (forthcoming), though the mean here is smaller than the statistical one.
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month and is equal to the Tobacco Price Index divided by the Consumer
Price Index (CPI).14 The data were acquired from the? Annual Report on
the Consumer Price Index?and the?Monthly Report on the Retail Price
Survey.?These data were also seasonally adjusted using X-12 ARIMA.
Disposable income (Yt) is real per capita disposable income per month
for salaried worker households. These data were from the? Annual Report
of Family Income and Expenditure Survey?and calculated by dividing the
average household disposable income by the average number of household
members per household and the CPI. The data were seasonally adjusted
using X-12 ARIMA.
Tax Rate (Taxt) is the rate of tax increase based on data from the
? Public Finance Statistics.?
US Report is a dummy variable for the release of?Smoking and Health:
Report of the Advisory Committee to the Surgeon General of the Public
Health Service?in 1964 in the U.S. The Japanese government first officially
disseminated?A Notice about Health Damage from Smoking?to prefectural
governors and the mayors of several cities following the U.S. Report. This
variable had a value of 0 from Jan. 1951 to Dec. 1963, and 1 from Jan.
1964 to Oct. 1999.
Nicotine-tar release is a dummy variable relating to the release of
nicotine and tar information in main newspapers in Japan. The variable
had a value of 0 from Jan. 1951 to Mar. 1967, and 1 from Apr. 1967 to
Oct. 1999.
Warning1 is a dummy variable relating to the warning? Let ?s be
careful about smoking too much for health reasons? printed on cigarette
14As shown in Merriman (2002), cigarette smuggling may exist if the domestic price is
different from the foreign one, but the smuggling seems not a big issue in Japan. It may
be because of geography (island nation).
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packages. The variable had a value of 0 from Jan. 1951 to Jul. 1971, and 1
from Aug. 1971 to Oct. 1999.
Dummy7504 is a dummy variable for the period from Apr. 1975 to
July 1975, with a value of 1 from Apr. 1975 to July 1975, and 0 in all other
periods. The tax increase proposal was passed by the Finance Committee
on 24 Apr. 1975, but it was voted down by the Lower House on 4 Jul. 1975.
Dummy7509 is a dummy variable for the period Sept. 1975 to Nov.
1975, with a value of 1 from Sept. 1975 to Nov. 1975, and 0 in all other
periods. The tax increase proposal was submitted to the Diet again on 20
Sept. 1975 and was enforced on 18 Dec. 1975.
Workplace ban is a dummy variable for smoking bans. It had a value
of 0 from Jan. 1951 to Mar. 1978, and 1 from Apr. 1978 when the smoking
ban in facilities such as hospitals was mandated to Oct. 1999.
Research is a dummy variable for smoking research.15 It had a value
of 0 from Jan. 1951 to Mar. 1986, and a value of 1 from Apr. 1986, when
the Smoking Research Foundation was established, until Oct. 1999.
Report1 is a dummy variable for the 1st edition of the? Report on
Smoking and Health.?This variable had a value of 0 from Jan. 1951 to
Sept. 1987, and a value of 1 from Oct. 1987, when the report was released,
until Oct. 1999.
Warning2 is a dummy variable relating to the warning? Let ?s be
careful about smoking too much because there is a possibility it will ruin
your health.?This variable had a value of 0 from Jan. 1951 to Dec. 1989,
and a value of 1 from Jan. 1990, when the warning was mandated, until
15After this event (April 1986 founding of the Smoking Research Foundation), many
scientific articles on smoking damage have been reported from this foundation in every
year since that time. The funding volume is huge, and the number of articles is averagely
about 140 every year during 1986-2001. The research pursuers are averagely about 450
persons every year. The yearly funding is about 330 million yen. The detail is in the
Appendix A (A2) of Wan (2001).
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Oct. 1999.
Report2 is a dummy variable for the 2nd edition of?Report on Smoking
and Health.?It had a value of 0 from Jan. 1951 to May 1993, and a value
of 1 from Jun. 1993, when the report was released, until Oct. 1999.
Hoarding is a dummy variable for the months just before cigarette tax
increases. According to Wan (2005), the lead of Taxt is a valid proxy for
Hoarding.
Stock is a dummy variable for the months immediately after cigarette
tax increases. According to Wan (2005), Taxt is a valid proxy for Stock.
4.2 Unit root tests
If any of these variables were not stationary, some problems of statistical
inference would arise if GMM or OLS were used. Therefore, each variable
was tested for stationarity using the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test
and Phllips-Perron test (1988) (see Table 2b).
The null hypothesis that Ct, Nicotine intaket, Tar intaket, Pt, ∆Yt
and Taxt have unit roots was rejected at the 1% significance level; these
variables were thus considered to be stationary. Because the null hypothesis
that Yt had a unit root could not be rejected at any conventional significance
level, Yt was not considered stationary. Including Yt while using GMM and
OLS could have created a bias. Therefore, ∆Yt was used in the estimation.
4.3 Estimation technique
GMM and OLS methods were used to obtain parameter estimates. For
the addiction model, OLS estimates may not be consistent because of the
endogeneity of past and future consumption and because of the possibility
that the use of leads and lags gave rise to serial correlation in the residuals.
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To obtain consistent estimates, GMM was used.16 OLS was used for the
non-addiction model.
The GMM estimates will be consistent if suitable instrument variables
are used. As discussed in Wan (forthcoming), the cigarette price and tax
is exogenous in Japan from the viewpoint of consumers because the govern-
ment controls the price and new law is needed for a tax increase. The nom-
inal cigarette price cannot be changed, except for a change in the cigarette
tax. Six cigarette tax increases were passed by the Japanese government
from 1951 to 1999, not because of fluctuations in cigarette demands, but
mainly because of a large deficit in public funds.17 The consumer can per-
fectly anticipate the tax increase because there are several months (three to
six months) between the enactment and implementation of a new cigarette
tax law. Furthermore, because prices are strongly correlated with consump-
tion, they are thought to be good instrument variables for consumption. The
lagged cigarette price was used as an instrument variable for past cigarette
consumption, while the lead of price was used as an instrument variable for
future cigarette consumption. The leads and lags of the rate of the tobacco
tax increase were also included as additional instruments.18
Hansen ?s (1982) J test for over-identifying restrictions implied by the
instruments was used as a specification test of the model. To obtain consis-
tent estimates, the hoarding and stock proxies (current and lead of tax rate)
were used to distinguish purchases from consumption following the method
16The time trend would be a good proxy for capturing the effect caused by policy change.
However, GMM instruments need stationary variables; thus, only dummy variables were
used here.
17See The History of the Japanese Tobacco Monopoly (in Japanese, Nihon Tabako
Senbaishi).
18Auld and Grootendorst (2004, p. 1125, ln. 1-3) have noted that the estimable RA
model tends to yield spurious evidence when aggregate data are used; if, however, prices
are exogenous, instrumental variable estimates of the coefficients on the lag and lead of
consumption will be consistent. Cigarette consumption in Japan would be an exceptional
case.
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of Wan (2005).
5 Empirical Results
5.1 Cigarette consumption
The parameter estimates of RA and non-addiction models are reported in
Table 3. The RA models (models 1 and 2) were estimated by the GMM.
The non-addiction model (Model 3) was estimated by OLS to test whether
the effects of anti-smoking policies were changed by the model selection.
The results of these three models showed little difference, except for the
addictiveness.
In the columns for models 1 and 2, the coefficients of Ct−1 and Ct+1 were
positive and significant. The coefficient of Pt was significantly negative. The
estimated values satisfied the stability conditions. Thus, these results are
consistent with the RA model. The coefficient of ∆Yt was not significant in
Model 1 or in Model 2.19 The coefficient of US Report was positive but not
significant.
The coefficients of Nicotine-tar release and Warning1 were positive
and significant. It appears that consumers shifted to low nicotine/tar and
filter types of cigarettes after information on nicotine and tar had been
disclosed, as shown in figures 1 and 2; however, consumers maintained or
increased consumption of cigarettes to maintain their intake of nicotine.20
The coefficient of Workplace was negative and significant, implying that the
smoking ban policy was effective. The coefficient of Research was negative
and significant. Thus, cigarette research has a negative effect on cigarette
19∆Yt/Yt was also used to capture the income effect. The estimated coefficient of income
was not significant, and the coefficients of other variables were almost unchanged.
20Consumers also maintained their intake of tar because low-nicotine brands always
have low tar.
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consumption, as expected. The coefficients of Report1 and Warning2 were
negative and significant. The coefficient of Report2 was negative but not
significant. This result can be interpreted as follows: consumers decreased
consumption in response to disclosures of health damage information. Ac-
cording to Figure 2, average nicotine and tar per cigarette declined only
slightly and was quite stable after the 1980s. The consumer had to reduce
consumption to adjust the stock of nicotine and tar gradually, in response
to new health hazard information. This behavior is consistent with the RA
prediction.
The coefficient of Dummy7504 was significantly positive, implying that
consumers hoarded cigarettes when tax increase proposals were passed. The
coefficient of Dummy7509 was not significant. The coefficient of Hoarding
was positive, significant, and large, while the coefficient of Stock was nega-
tive, significant, and large. Thus, consumers took future price information
into account and hoarded cigarettes just before the price increase. This re-
sult is similar to results found by Wan (2005).
Robust test using the non-addiction model
By the RA model, current consumption depended on past and future
consumption. Thus, consumption changed only gradually. It is possible
that the RA model makes it difficult for the consumers to respond in a
timely manner to health information and regulations. A standard model
(Model 3) was also applied, but results were very close to those of the RA
model. Consumer responses to information on price and health suggest that
smoking behavior is consistent with the RA prediction regarding the effects
of health information.
17
Robust test for small β
The value of β implied by the results in Table 3 was too small.21 Es-
timating β precisely for a specific good is considered difficult.22 Here, a
discount factor was imposed a priori to estimate the RA model (Model 2)
again. Table 4a lists the long-run price elasticities. Long-run price elastic-
ities were stable when β was changed from 0.4 to 0.95 and were very close
to those of Model 2 shown in Table 3.
Elasticity and rate of contribution of each factor
The estimated coefficients and sample means in Table 2a were used to
estimate the short- and long-run price elasticities,23 which are shown in the
rows labeled? short-run ?and? long-run .?The long-run price elasticity
was approximately 2.055 times as large as the short-run price elasticity, and
close to the estimate based on annual data.24
The elasticities of all variables based on Model 1 are summarized in
columns 3 and 4 of Table 4b. Using the mean and the relative change
of each variable, the contribution rate of each factor was calculated based
on the long-run elasticity. The results are summarized in columns 5-8 of
Table 4b. Here, ∆C/C¯ = (COct.1999 − CJan.1951)/C¯ = 0.397, ∆P/P¯ =
(POct.1999 − PJan.1951)/P¯ = − 1.441. When t = six periods, the absolute
21Becker et al. (1994) found similar results for the time discount parameter from this
sort of test.
22As shown in Footnote 10, the information effect may cause this small β. here I do not
make this test but I plan to do it in a new research.
23The results differed from those by Haden (1990). Haden estimated the price and
income elasticities of Japanese cigarette consumption using annual data for 1964-1983.
Income elasticity was estimated to be 0.161 and the price elasticity to be −0.948. Thus,
cigarettes are a normal good. The results presented in this paper also differ from those by
Yorozu and Zhou (2002), who estimated the income and price elasticities of demand for
cigarettes to be 0.291 and −0.986, respectively. According to Gruber and Ko¨szegi (2001),
the long-run price elasticity in the U.S. (based on monthly data) is −0.8, while here the
long-run price elasticity in Japan was estimated to be −0.524. Thus, the absolute value
of the long-run price elasticity was somewhat smaller in Japan than in the U.S.
24The long-run elasticity was approximately −0.67, see Wan (forthcoming).
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value of elasticity was larger than that for 90% of the long-run elasticity.
The contribution rates of? tax related,?? information related,?and
?control policy related?were approximately 166.24%, 45.89%, and −66.37%,
respectively. The summation of the contribution rate of?information related
?and?control policy related?was −20.48%. This means that anti-smoking
policies have reduced consumption, but the decreasing price has increased
consumption.
5.2 Nicotine and tar intake
Data on nicotine and tar price were unavailable; thus, cigarette price was
used as a proxy for the price of nicotine. The intake of nicotine and tar
was estimated with the RA model by GMM. Three lags and three leads
of cigarette price, two lags and two leads of cigarette tax rate, and other
explanatory variables were used as instruments. The results are reported in
Table 5.25
In the column for nicotine intake, the coefficient of Pt was significantly
negative and the short- and long-run price elasticities were -0.377 and -
0.863, respectively. The stability conditions were satisfied. The coefficient
of hoarding was significantly positive, and the coefficient of stock was signif-
icantly negative. The coefficients of Ct−1, Ct+1 were significantly positive.
Thus, these results are consistent with the RA model. The coefficient of
Nicotine-tar release was significantly positive, implying that the release of
nicotine and tar content significantly increased the intake of nicotine. The
other variables, Warning1, Workplace ban, Research, Report1, Warning2,
and Report2 had a significantly negative impact on nicotine intake.
The column for tar intake shows that the coefficient of Pt was signif-
25∆Yt/Yt was also used to capture the income effect. The estimated coefficient of income
was not significant, and the coefficients of other variables were almost unchanged.
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icantly negative and the short- and long-run price elasticities were -0.401
and -0.844, respectively. The stability conditions were satisfied. The coeffi-
cient of hoarding was significantly positive, and the coefficient of stock was
significantly negative. The coefficients of Ct−1 and Ct+1 were positive and
significant. Thus, these results are consistent with the RA model. The coef-
ficients of US Report and Nicotine-tar release were significantly positive,
implying that the US Report and the release of nicotine and tar content
information significantly increased the intake of tar. The other variables,
Warning1, Workplace ban, Research, Report1, Warning2, and Report2
had significantly negative impacts on tar intake.
Note that the sign of the coefficient of Warning1 was inverse to that
for cigarette consumption, as shown in Table 3. Consumption increased
in 1972, but the intake of nicotine and tar decreased. This implies that
the consumer switched to low nicotine and tar brands but consumed more
cigarettes to keep up the intake of nicotine and tar. This compensative
behavior is consistent with nicotine ?s addictive nature. From figures 1, 2,
and 3, it is clear that structural changes in nicotine and tar intake took
place in the mid-1960s, when the U.S. report and release of nicotine and
tar content were implemented.26 These results are consistent with those for
cigarette consumption and also with those of inter-brand cigarette demands
found by Wan (2004).
6 Conclusions and Policy Implications
The Japanese government has implemented a number of anti-smoking poli-
cies, including the dissemination of information on the negative health im-
26A Chow test was also performed and confirmed this structural change. The estimation
results are available upon request.
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pacts of smoking, taxation of cigarettes, and smoking bans. Such anti-
smoking measures have increased over time. To assess these policy effects,
this study theoretically and empirically examined smoking behavior, simul-
taneously, by first considering addictiveness, health information, taxation,
and regulations, such as smoking bans. Theoretically, the consumer over-
consumes cigarettes because of a shortage of health information and reduces
consumption when new information is announced. The estimation results
based on monthly consumption data on cigarettes, nicotine, and tar by
Japanese salaried worker households and several policy events were basi-
cally consistent with the predictions of the RA model for health information
and also consistent with the results of Japan ?s national smoking surveys.
Consumers responded to increased health information by changing their
cigarette type and reducing or quitting smoking. The share of filtered
cigarettes has been increasing since the 1960s, following the first official
information disclosure on cigarettes and health in Japan. More consumers
have also switched to low-nicotine and low-tar cigarettes since newspaper
releases of data on nicotine and tar in 1967; however, nicotine addiction has
led consumers to raise their consumption of cigarettes to maintain nicotine
intake. The printing of?smoking is harmful to health?on cigarette packag-
ing since 1972 has strengthened the consumer switch to lower tar/nicotine
cigarettes but has compensatively raised total consumption to maintain nico-
tine intake. Other tobacco control policies since 1972, including workplace
smoking bans, smoking science research, health warnings, nicotine labeling,
and reports on smoking, have been effective in reducing nicotine and tar
intake.27 Anti-smoking policies have reduced consumption, but price de-
27The 1967 information release has implicitly had a negative impact on nicotine and
tar intake since 1972 because the consumer could not choose his or her preferred brands
based on nicotine and tar information if the tar contents in 1967 had not been released.
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creases have increased consumption. The contribution rate of anti-smoking
policies to the reduction of cigarette consumption from 1951 to 1999 was
−20.48%.
These analyses have shown that health information, tax increases, and
smoking bans are all effective for tobacco control. Long-run policies have
had as much as double the effect of short-run policies. Compared to residents
of other Westernized countries, the Japanese have less knowledge about how
smoking affects heart disease and other health problems.28 It appears that
people in Japan generally have inadequate knowledge of the health haz-
ards of smoking. The cigarette tax rate in Japan is also still rather low.
Hence, the Japanese government should continue its anti-smoking policies
and, in particular, strengthen information dissemination and taxation pro-
grams. Other smoking bans are also considered to be useful. Additionally,
broad and comprehensive implementation of FCTC policies in Japan should
have a considerable positive impact.
This study used several dummies as proxies for anti-smoking events.
Other approaches such as an updating process based on Bayesian mean
and variance methods would be a good measure of transition in consumer
belief.29 The consumer may be hyperbolic, as proposed by Gruber and
Ko¨szegi (2001). The welfare change arising from health information and
taxation was not analyzed here in detail.30 These issues are topics for future
research.
28As shown in Viscusi (1992), 81% in 1977 and 83% in 1981 of all respondents knew
? smoking is one cause of lung cancer,?and 68% in 1977 and 74% in 1981 responded that
? smoking is one cause of heart disease? in the U.S.
29See Chern (1995) for details.
30There are a number of studies, such as that by Ikeda and Gombi (2003), that have
analyzed the change in consumer welfare within the framework of rational habit formation.
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Appendix: Surveys
1978 Survey on Smoking
An opinion poll on smoking was conducted by the Mainichi Shimbun Corpo-
ration (Mainichi Newspaper) in April 1978. The 2,176 pollees were randomly
chosen from among persons aged 20 and over in Japan and were interviewed
by the polltakers. The response rate was 73%. The smoking rate of adult
males was 75% and that of adult females was 13%. These results are broadly
consistent with the results of the Japan Tobacco, Inc. survey, in which the
male smoking rate was 74.7% and the female rate was 16.2%. Respondents
were asked the following question: ?What do you regard as the harmful
effects of smoking??There were 12 items from which to choose and more
than one item could be chosen.
1981 National Survey on Smoking
This survey (in Japanese, Kitsuen ni Kansuru Zenkoku Ishiki Chosa) was
conducted by Tadao Shimao, the chief researcher at the Research Institute
of Tuberculosis, Japan Anti-Tuberculosis Association, in 1981. The survey
encompassed 5,394 adult persons, who were family members or friends of
members of the 47 branches of the Japan Anti-Tuberculosis Association in
all prefectures of Japan. The survey was conducted from Feb. 1981 to Mar.
1981 using a self-registering paper questionnaire method. There were 2,933
male respondents (54.3% of the total) and 2,461 female respondents (45.6%
of the total). The male and female shares in the total population were 49.2%
and 50.8%, respectively, in Oct. 1980.
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1988 Survey on Smoking and Health
This survey (in Japanese, Kitsuen to Kenkou ni Kansuru Yoron Chosa) was
conducted by the Public Relations Office of the Prime Minister ?s Office,
Japan, from 27 October to 6 November 1988. The survey targeted 2,339
persons, aged 20 and over. Survey recipients were selected from throughout
Japan using a two-stage stratified random sampling method. The response
rate for the direct-interview survey was 78.0%.
1999 National Survey on Smoking and Health
This survey was conducted by the Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare
of Japan from February 17 to March 2, 1999 and targeted 12,858 persons
aged 15 and over. Recipients were randomly selected from the sample used
for the 1998 Basic Survey on National Life in fiscal year 1998. The response
rate was 91.9%, and respondents were interviewed directly. The smoking
rate was 52.8% for adult males and 13.4% for adult females. These results
are very close to those of the Japan Tobacco Inc. survey, in which rates
were 55.2% for males and 13.3% for females. Respondents were asked the
following question:?What do you regard as the harmful effects of smoking??
There were eight answers from which to choose and more than one could be
chosen.
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all respondents survey 1978 survey 1999 difference (test statistics)
Lung cancer 66% 84.5% 22.5% (17.38)***
Bronchitis 45% 65.5% 20.5% (17.39)***
Heart disease 16% 40.5% 24.5% (27.31)***
Influence on pregnacy 20% 79.6% 59.6% (64.21)***
Tobacco dependence 44% 51.8% 7.8% (6.77)***
smokers
Lung cancer 65% 75% 10% (5.90)***
Bronchitis 45% 50% 5% (2.77)***
Heart disease 18% 37% 19% (12.92)***
Influence on pregnacy 10% 72% 62% (51.02)***
Tobacco dependence 43% 55% 12% (6.69)***
non-smokers
Lung cancer 67% 89.6% 22.6% (16.23)***
Bronchitis 46% 69.2% 23.2% (15.22)***
Heart disease 15% 42.5% 27.5% (23.47)***
Influence on pregnacy 28% 85.4% 57.4% (42.54)***
Tobacco dependence 46% 50.3% 4.3% (2.791)***
Note: ***: significant at 1% level; **: significant at 5% level; *: significant at 10% level.
smokers survey1981 survey1988 survey1999 D1 D2
harmful to health 55.7% 78.6% 85.5% 22.9% 6.9%
(12.61)*** (4.30)***
costs a lot 6.2% 9.0% 39.2% 2.8% 30.2%
(2.42)*** (22.98)***
6.1% 20.3% 29.3% 14.2% 9.0%
(9.16)*** (5.47)***
6.2% 12.6% 14.5% 6.4% 1.9%
(4.88)*** (1.42)**
advised by doctors 4.5% na 10.5% na na
na 11.5% 13.1% na 1.6%
(1.24)
na na 2.4% na na
smoking ban in public
areas
prohibition at one's
workplace
Note: ***: significant at 1% level; **: significant at 5% level; *: significant at 10% level; `D1': the gap
between the figures for the 1981 and 1988 surveys; `D2': the gap between the figures for the 1988 and
1989 surveys; `na' means `not available' or `no data.'
Table 1a The proportions of those who know about the damage from smoking
(Asymptotic t statistics in parentheses)
Table 1b Results of ``Why do you want to reduce or quit smoking?''
(Asymptotic t statistics in parentheses)
people around me do
not want me to smoke
advised by family
members, etc.
??
Table 2a Summary statistics, Jan. 1951- Oct. 1999
Variable Mean Std.Div. Max. Min.
Ct 1.447 1.074 5.225 0.688
Nicotine intaket 37.549 13.555 136.363 13.599
Tar intaket 483.872 187.1416 1789.434 160.218
Pt 3.104 1.097 6.942 1.72
Yt 8.724 3.658 14.428 1.924
∆Yt 0.02 0.231 1.135 -1.375
Taxt 0.002 0.025 0.491 0
Table 2b Unit root tests (ADF and Phillips-Perron), Jan. 1951- Oct. 1999
Variable 
Lag length (Test statistics) Lag length (Test statistics)
Ct 1 (-4.094)
*** 5 (-5.692)***
Nicotine intaket 1 (-3.498)
*** 5 (-4.704)***
Tar intaket 1 (-3.381)
** 5 (-4.447)***
Pt 2 (-1.040)
*** 5 (-4.967)***
Yt 5 (-2.249) 5 (-1.677)
∆Yt 5 (-14.667)
*** 5 (-57.119)***
Taxt 4 (-10.956)*** 5 (-24.318)
***
Note: `Max.' and `Min.' are maximum value and mimimum value, respectively; Ct is denominated in
number of packs; Pt is denominated in units of 100 yen per pack; Taxt is the rate of tax increase, which
is not seasonally adjusted.
ADF test Phillips-Perron test
Note: ***: significant at 1% level; **: significant at 5% level; *: significant at 10% level; The tests of
ADF and Phillips-Perron for unit roots are in levels; No trend but an intercept is included in the test
equations.
??
coef. (t-stat.) coef. (t-stat.) coef. (t-stat.)
Constant 0.870 (7.871)*** 0.959 (9.597)*** 2.515 (16.126)***
Ct-1 0.517 (18.357)
*** 0.508 (16.870)***
Ct+1 0.024 (1.966)
** 0.022 (1.694)*
Pt -0.098 (-5.115)
*** -0.115 (-7.060)*** -0.347 (-10.287)***
∆Yt 0.000 (-0.024) 0.000 (0.038) 0.001 (0.148)
(Jan. 1964) US_Report 0.026 (1.289) -0.038 (-0.693)
(Apr. 1975) Dummy7504 0.215 (12.505)*** 0.210 (12.573)*** 0.569 (10.428)***
(Sept. 1975) Dummy7509 0.04 (1.944)* 0.033 (1.692)* 0.094 (1.516)
(Apr. 1967) Nicotine-tar release 0.142 (6.369)*** 0.148 (6.723)*** 0.161 (3.170)***
(Aug. 1971) Warning1 0.147 (4.660)*** 0.138 (4.762)*** 0.159 (3.180)***
(Apr. 1978) Workplace ban -0.068 (-3.370)*** -0.069 (-3.414)*** -0.101 (-2.455)**
(Apr. 1986) Research -0.107 (-3.536)*** -0.104 (-3.410)*** -0.135 (-2.566)**
(Oct. 1987) Report1 -0.095 (-2.713)*** -0.1 (-2.793)*** -0.192 (-3.430)***
(Jan. 1990) Warning2 -0.075 (-3.336)*** -0.079 (-3.371)*** -0.193 (-3.673)***
(Jun. 1993) Report2 -0.024 (-1.500) -0.025 (-1.505) -0.061 (-1.304)
Hoarding 6.011 (33.187)*** 5.946 (32.051)*** 6.207 (49.756)***
Stock -5.585 (-29.948)*** -5.514 (-28.693)*** -1.618 (-14.194)***
?θ2β-1<0 (-35.742)*** (-34.670)***
?1-1<0 (-77.741)
*** (-74.721)***
?2-1>0 (8.163)
*** (7.659)***
short-run ε -0.218 (-5.296)*** -0.255 (-7.540)*** -0.745 (-10.286)***
long-run ε -0.458 (-6.379)*** -0.524 (-10.520)*** -0.745 (-10.286)***
Adjust R2
D-W Stat.
J-Stat.
Obs.
Independent
Variable
Model 3
0.978
2.296
0.978 0.978
Model 2Model 1
Table 3 Estimates of rational addiction and non-addiction model with health information and other
tobacco control policies, Dependent Variable = Ct, with distinction between purchase and consumption.
(Asymptotic t statistics in parentheses) Jan. 1951- Oct. 1999
(Event
Time)
Note: ***: significant at 1% level; **: significant at 5% level; *: significant at 10% level; The
instruments of Models 1 and 2: three lags and three leads of price, two lags and two leads of tax rate,
other explanatory variables; the p-value for the J-test of Models 1 and 2 is 1, respectively.
0.01 0.009
580 580 583
1.982 1.984
??
Table 4a Robustness test, impose β a priori (Model 2)
β 0.950 0.900 0.800 0.700 0.600 0.500 0.400
long-run ε 0.564 0.572 0.557 0.548 0.556 0.550 0.551
Table 4b Short- and long-run elasticity, rate of contribution of each factor Jan. 1951 - Oct. 1999
X
(variable)
short-run
e
long-run
e ∆X/X
long-run e
?∆X/X
contribution
rate of X
total effect
(sumation of
contribution
rate)
Tax related P -0.218 -0.458 -1.441 0.660 166.24% 166.24%
US_report 0.019 0.039 1 0.039 9.86%
Release of
nicotine
and tar
0.102 0.214 1 0.214 53.85%
Warning1 0.105 0.221 1 0.221 55.75%
Report1 -0.068 -0.143 1 -0.143 -36.03%
Warning2 -0.054 -0.113 1 -0.113 -28.44%
Report2 -0.017 -0.036 1 -0.036 -9.10%
Workplace
ban -0.049 -0.102 1 -0.102 -25.79%
Research -0.077 -0.161 1 -0.161 -40.58%
Other factors -0.182 -45.76% -45.76%
Total 0.397 100% 100%
Note: Long-run ε calculated by GMM estimates.
Note: Author's calculation by estimated coefficients of Model 1 in Table 3. Here, ∆C?C = (C1999 - C1951)
?mean of C = 0.397, ∆P?P=(P1999 - P1951)?mean of P = -1.441. When t = six periods, the absolute
value of elasticity is larger than the one of 90% of long-run elasticity.
Control policy
related
45.89%Informationrelated
-66.37%
??
coef. (t-stat.) coef. (t-stat.)
Constant 33.875 (8.899)*** 456.565 (8.164)***
Ct-1 0.552 (13.125)
*** 0.516 (10.041)***
Ct+1 0.034 (2.090)
** 0.031 (1.897)*
Pt -4.314 (-8.001)
*** -59.477 (-7.443)***
∆Yt 0.136 (0.464) 1.706 (0.707)
(Jan. 1964) US_Report 0.214 (0.472) 11.663 (1.670)*
(Apr. 1975) Dummy7504 3.662 (1.753)* 56.201 (2.129)**
(Sept. 1975) Dummy7509 -1.326 (1.598) -10.986 (-1.003)
(Apr. 1967) Nicotine-tar release 1.278 (3.350)*** 19.698 (2.853)***
(Aug. 1971) Warning1 -1.850 (-2.810)*** -19.901 (-2.701)***
(Apr. 1978) Workplace ban -7.472 (-7.882)*** -66.915 (-6.383)***
(Apr. 1986) Research -1.933 (-3.222)*** -46.238 (-4.527)***
(Oct. 1987) Report1 -1.407 (-2.675)*** -37.637 (-3.593)***
(Jan. 1990) Warning2 -2.279 (-4.864)*** -42.678 (-4.3.371)***
(Jun. 1993) Report2 -2.454 (-5.497)*** -32.294 (-4.845)***
Hoarding 148.863 (32.026)*** 2003.402 (40.823)***
Stock -148.271 (-17.899)*** -1876.310 (-16.222)***
?θ2β-1<0 (-25.827)*** (-27.594)***
?1-1<0 (-56.932)
*** (-56.726)***
?2-1>0 (5.662)
*** (4.724)***
short-run ? -0.377 (-8.451)*** -0.401 (-7.745)***
long-run ? -0.863 (-14.910)*** -0.844 (-14.298)***
Adjust R2
D-W Stat.
J-Stat.
Obs.
0.011
580 580
0.014
(Event
Time)
Table 5 Estimates of intake of nicotine and tar with health information and other tobacco control
policies, Dependent Variable = nicotine intake, tar intake, rational addiction model with distinction
between purchase and consumption.
(Asymptotic t statistics in parentheses) Jan. 1951- Oct. 1999
Note: ***: significant at 1% level; **: significant at 5% level; *: significant at 10% level; The
instruments of columns 3 and 4: three lags and three leads of price, two lags and two leads of tax
rate, other explanatory variables; the p-value for the J-test of columns 3 and 4 is 1, respectively.
0.979 0.982
1.845 1.671
Independent
Variable
Dep. var. = nicotine intake Dep. var. = tar intake
??
Figure 1 The share of filter cigarettes in total sales 1951-84 and charcoal filter cigarettes in total sales of filter brands 1970-84
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Source: The History of Tobacco Monopoly, The Budget of a Country and Author's calculation
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Figure 2 The nicotine and tar level 1951-1999
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Source: The History of Tobacco Monopoly, The Japanese Tobacco Association and Author's calculation
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Figure 3 The nicotine and tar intake level 1951-1999
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Source: The History of Tobacco Monopoly, Japanese Tobacco Association and Author's calculation
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